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Abstract
The paper is devoted to the mathematical analysis of an optimal con-
trol problem arising in a generalized principal-agent model with limited
liability constraint. We present the economic model and the mathematical
formulation.
Though the problem seems “simple”, it presents many difficulties that
are hard to overcome. After a formal resolution, we give an existence and
uniqueness result for this problem.
Keywords : Optimal control, Bottleneck constraints, Incentives, Delega-
tion, Personnel Economics
Classification AMS : 49J20, 49M25
1 Introduction
Contracts which incorporate limits on the maximum loss that an agent can be
forced to bear as a consequence of contracting with a principal are referred
to as limited liability contracts. It is well known, for example, that, when a
project owner requires the unobservable effort of a risk neutral agent, limited
liability constraint precludes the agent from paying the owner the full value of
her project. In short, under moral hazard, limited liability constraint makes
it no longer possible for a principal to “sell the firm” to a risk neutral agent.
Similarily, imagine a principal hiring a risk neutral agent to choose a project
among several alternatives, the probability of success of the project being a
function of the agent’s talent to choose a good project. Assume that agent’s
talent is his private information. The introduction of limited liability constraint
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within this adverse selection framework precludes the principal from punishing
the agent when he turns out to be inefficient.
To simplify the resolution of this kind of model, the modeler usually first
guesses the way the limited liability constraint is binding and checks ex post
that this constraint is indeed stricly satisfied. Under moral hazard, the economic
intuition is that only the limited liability constraint in case of failure may be
binding. Under adverse selection, the modeler guesses that only the limited
liability constraint associated with the least efficient agent may be binding.
The purpose of this research is to investigate how the modeler selects a limited
liability constraint on utility within a generalized principal-agent problem. A
generalized principal-agent problem arises when the principal’s payoff function
depends on both the private information and the unobservable action of the
agent ( see. Myerson (1982)).
Consider the following standard principal-agent framework. First a princi-
pal follows an agent’s recommendation to choose a project among several al-
ternatives. For example, a chief executive officer follows a product manager’s
recommendation to choose on how and when a new product is launched. The
agent is endowed with a talent parameter that we interpret as his match to the
project. We assume that the agent’s talent is his private information. Then the
agent spends an unobservable effort to realize the project. This effort may have
different interpretations, e.g. time or attention devoted to project realization.
For example, selling effort would include developing and updating customers
address lists or contracting customers about upcoming sales and new merchan-
dise. Hence, the project’s success probability depends both on the agent’s talent
and effort. Therefore a model in which adverse selection and moral hazard are
jointly present is analyzed. The resolution is adapted from Faynzilberg and
Kumar (2000) but we assume that the agent is risk neutral and protected by
limited liability constraint on utility.
Section 2 briefly describes the generalized principal-agent model and the
principal’s optimization problem following Faynzilberg and Kumar’s procedure.
Faynzilberg and Kumar analyze the existence of optimal contracts within a
generalized principal-agent problem. The agent being risk averse within their
decomposition procedure, we adapt their framework to risk neutral agent pro-
tected by limited liability on utility. The introduction of limited liability con-
straint on utility is analyzed by an economic intuition. Then, we perform a
formal and numerical resolution of the optimal control problem that we derive
from this model. The last section is devoted to the rigorous proof of an existence
result: we may give the analytical form of the solution.
2 The model
There are two risk-neutral actors in the model: a principal and an agent. The
principal (the owner of the firm) is the residual claimant of profits generated by
a project that requires the agent’s unobservable effort in order to be realized.
The level of output resulting from the relationship is determined by a produc-
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tion function, y = f(t, e, ε), with three inputs: the agent’s talent t ∈ T = [0, 1]
that we interpret as how well the agent matches to the project, the agent’s effort
e ∈ E = [0, 1] and a random shock ε (Nature). To simplify matters as much as
possible, take the case where the space is binary: y ∈ {y, y}. Success generates
gross value y while failure provides y with y < y. p(e, t) denotes the probability
that the project succeeds given the inputs (e, t). Talent and effort are essential
for success, so p(e, 0) = 0 and p(0, t) = 0 respectively for all e and t. Higher
levels of effort and higher realizations of t decrease the conditional probabil-
ity that the smaller level of performance will be realized, i.e., pe(e, t) ≥ 0 and
pt(e, t) ≥ 0, where subscripts denote partial derivatives. The expected marginal
impact of the agent’s effort is also assumed to be greater in more productive
environments, that is pet(e, t) ≥ 0. The agent associates a monetary cost g(e, t)
with undertaking an effort equal to e. We make the following standard assump-
tions: g(e, t) is strictly increasing and convex in e, ge > 0, gee > 0 and higher
talents have lower effort cost and lower marginal effort cost, that is, gt < 0 and
get < 0. Throughout the paper, the reservation utility of the agent is normalized
to zero. We assume that the agent is protected by limited liability on utility.
This assumption implies that the optimal transfer to the agent cannot be so low
that the agent’s utility can be negative. In case of employment contracts, many
legal restrictions limit the worker’s liability. Among these restrictions one can
point out laws exonerating the worker from liability for damages caused during
the execution of the contract. The resulting utility function of the agent is:
u(w, e, t) = w(y, t) − g(e, t). The principal is a risk neutral individual with a
profit function: pi(y, w, t) = y − w(y, t).
The output is determined both by the agent’s talent (private information)
and the agent’s unobservable effort. The principal faces adverse selection fol-
lowed by moral hazard. The game begins with the agent privately observing his
talent t. Next, the principal offers to the agent an opportunity to participate in
the production of the outcome y, determined by the agent’s talent, the agent’s
effort and Nature. None of these inputs is observable by the principal. At the
time the principal is contracting with the agent, she knows that the agent’s
talent is drawn from a distribution function F (t) with density function f(t) for
every t ∈ T . The agent’s acceptance (respectively refusal) of the principal’s offer
leads to the agent’s choice of a type contingent transfer from a menu offered by
the principal, and an effort (respectively ends the game with the agent realizing
his reservation utility). Finally, Nature chooses a random productivity shock.
The game ends with the principal making to the agent a transfer w(y, t) from
the set
{
w(y, t), w(y, t)
}
. The principal’s problem is the following
Maximize
e(.),w(.,.)
1∫
0
{
p(e, t)(y − w(y, t)) + (1− p(e, t))(y − w(y, t))} f(t)dt (1a)
subject to, for all e ∈ E, t ∈ T and t′ ∈ T :
p(e, t)w(y, t) + (1− p(e, t))w(y, t)− g(e, t) ≥ 0 (1b)
3
w(y, t) − g(e, t) ≥ 0 (1c)
e ∈ argmax p(e, t)w(y, t) + (1− p(e, t))w(y, t)− g(e, t) (1d)
U(w(y, t), e(t), t) ≥ U(w(y, t′), e(t′), t). (1e)
where
U(w(y, t′), e(t′), t) = p(e(t′), t)w(y, t′) + (1− p(e(t′), t))w(y, t′)− g(e(t′), t).
The principal maximizes (1a) her expected utility which depends on the prob-
ability of success. The agent’s talent being his private information, p(e, t) is
conditional to the density function of the agent’s talent. Inequalities (1b) and
(1c) ensure respectively the individual rationality of agent’s participation and
the agent’s limited liability on utility. Expressions (1d) and (1e) capture the
generalized incentive compatible constraints. To simplify matters as much as
possible we make the following assumptions
t ∼ U [0, 1] , g(e, t) = e
2
t
∀t ∈]0, 1] and p(e, t) = te.
First, the principal performs a “conditional” optimization: she chooses an opti-
mal incentive-compatible contract for every level of the agent’s indirect expected
utility. In short, the principal chooses an optimal contract ex-ante as a function
of the agent’s indirect expected utility. Then the principal selects an optimal
level of the indirect expected utility itself, subject to the participation constraint
and to the limited liability constraint on utility. The optimal contract ex-ante as
a function of the agent’s indirect expected utility, ∀t ∈]0, 1] is (see Faynzilberg
and Kumar (2000)).
e(t) = t
√
h(t)
3
, w(y, t) = V (t)− th(t)
3
, w(y, t) = V (t)− th(t)
3
+ 2
t
√
h(t)
3
,
with V (ta) the agent’s indirect expected utility and h(ta) the variation of the
agent’s indirect expected utility when the agent’s talent increases (dV (t)
dt
= h(t)).
Knowing the optimal contract ex-ante as a function of the agent’s indirect ex-
pected utility, the principal selects an optimal level of the indirect expected
utility itself, subject to the participation constraint and to the limited liability
constraint on utility.
While much of the limited liability literature has treated the adverse selection
and moral hazard separately, we investigate limited liability constraint on utility
within a generalized principal-agent framework. Under models that contain only
moral hazard, the economic intuition is that only the limited liability constraint
in case of failure may be binding because agent’s utility in case of success is
greater than agent’s utility in case of failure. Under models that contain only
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adverse selection, the modeler guesses that only the limited liability constraint
associated with the least efficient agent may be binding because the agent’s
utility when he is efficient is greater than when he is inefficient. Given the
joined presence of adverse selection and moral hazard and the particular form
of our problem (two outputs and a continuum of inputs) it may be not possible to
apply usual economic intuition. First since the optimal contract ex-ante implies
that w(y, t) ≥ w(y, t), the relevant constraint (1c) is w(y, t) − g(e, t) ≥ 0. The
principal’s program can be rewritten as
Maximize
V (ta)
∫ 1
0
{
t2a(y − y)
√
h(ta)
3
− V (ta)− tah(ta)
3
+ y
}
dta (2)
subject to, for t ∈]0, 1]
dV (ta)
dta
= h(ta) , V (0) = 0 , (3)
V (ta)− 2tah(ta)
3
≥ 0. (4)
The principal maximizes her expected profit as a function of the optimal contract
ex-ante (2) subject to the constraint (3) and to the limited liability constraint
on utility rewritten thanks to the optimal contract ex-ante (4) .
Second, we should take into account adverse selection. We do not know
whether agent’s utility is an increasing function of talent, even if we know that
it is true in expectation (h(t) ≥ 0). A first intuitive way to solve this problem
is to find the solution of the unconstrained program. It can be shown that
without limited liability constraint on the agent’s utility, the agent’s utility in
case of failure is negative, the principal selling the firm to the risk neutral agent
and the agent’s utility in case of success is positive. The introduction of limited
liability constraint on utility precludes the agent from bearing all the risks of the
relationship in case of failure. So within our framework, the modeler guesses that
only the limited liability constraint on utility in case of failure associated with
any talent is binding. The economic intuition allows to set w(y, t)− g(e, t) = 0.
We are now going to focus directely on the above optimal control prob-
lem without using economic intuition to bind the limited liability constraint on
utility. It has a very ”simple” form: we have to minimize a strictly convex
cost functional with a linear differential state equations and bottleneck con-
straints. This kind of contraints appear frequently in economics models and
can be treated via dynamical programming methods as in Bellman (2003) or
Miric˘a (1985). More recently, Bergounioux &Tiba (1996) and Bergounioux &
Tro¨ltzsch (1998) have studied such problems. The state equation was a partial
differential one but these problems were (in our opinion) much simpler. The
techniques that have been used in the quoted papers are not useful here.
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3 The optimal control problem
3.1 Setting the problem
From now, we consider the optimal control problem that we write as follows :

max J˜(V, h)
def
=
∫ 1
0
(−V (t)f(t)− ϕ(h(t))) dt
V ′(t) = h(t) on ]0, 1[, V (0) = 0 ,
0 ≤ t h(t) ≤ αV (t) ∀t ∈]0, 1] ,
(5)
where
ϕ(h)(t) =


[
t h(t)
3
− t2(y − y)
√
h
3
]
f(t) if h ≥ 0
+∞ else
and α ≥ 1.
Here “h ≥ 0” stands for : “h(t) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0, 1]”. Note that α = 3/2 in the
model that we presented in the previous section. Moreover, in the sequel we set
y − y = δ.
The above function is convex and Gaˆteaux -differentiable at h > 0 and
∂ϕ
∂h
(h)(t) =
t
3
− t
2δ
2
√
3 h(t)
.
We note that the feasible domain is not empty since it involves 0. This implies
that the infimum is non positive.
As the state equation is easy to solve we may give an equivalent form for
this problem, namely :
(P1)


min J(h)
def
=
∫ 1
0
(ϕ(h(t)) − h(t)F (t)) dt
0 ≤ t h(t) ≤ α
∫ t
0
h(s) ds ∀t ∈]0, 1] ,
h ∈ L1(0, 1) .
where F is the primitive function of f that vanishes at 1, i.e
F (t) =
∫ t
1
f(s) ds .
Indeed
J˜(V, h) =
∫ 1
0
(−V (t)F ′(t)− ϕ(h(t))) dt =
∫ 1
0
(V ′(t)F (t)− ϕ(h(t))) dt
with V (0) = 0 and F (1) = 0. With the state equation we get
J(h) = −J˜(V, h) =
∫ 1
0
(ϕ(h(t)) − h(t)F (t)) dt .
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In the sequel we set, ∀h ≥ 0 and ∀t ∈ [0, 1] ψ(h)(t) = ϕ(h(t)) − h(t)F (t)) i.e.
ψ(h)(t) =
[
t h(t)
3
− t2δ
√
h
3
]
f(t)− h(t)
∫ t
1
f(s) ds . (6)
Remark 3.1 The “natural” space for this optimal control problem is L1(0, 1)
since we only need the functions to be integrable. This implies that an eventual
Lagrange multiplier must belong to L∞(0, 1). In fact, we shall see in the forth-
coming sections that we are not able to prove the existence of solutions for any
α ≥ 1. We shall have to add regularity assumptions on the feasible functions
that have to belong to L∞(0, 1) in some cases.
The functional J is strictly convex with respect to h and the constraints are
linear. Therefore the solution of this problem (if it exists) is unique. First,
we should prove that problem (P)1 has a solution h∗. Though this problem
seems quite simple, we are not able to prove any existence result with classical
minimization techniques since the function J is not coercive and the feasible set
is not bounded. Moreover, usual qualification conditions are not easy to verify
(even the quite weak condition of Zowe and Kurcyusz (1979) and we cannot
prove easily the existence of Lagrange multipliers a priori.
In order to find the solution of this problem, we first perform a formal and
numerical analysis that allows to guess the solution. So we exhibit what could
be a suitable Lagrange multiplier in L1(0, 1). Then, we prove that a Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker type optimality system is satisfied. As the problem is convex, this
proves that we have found the unique solution of problem (P1).
3.2 Formal resolution of problem (P1)
Assume h∗ is the unique solution of (P). Let us set
L(h)(t) = t h(t)− α
∫ t
0
h(s) ds .
L is a linear continuous operator from L∞(0, 1) to L∞(0, 1). Assume we are able
to find a Lagrange multiplier λ ∈ L2(0, 1), so that we may define the Lagrangian
function of problem (P) as
L(h, λ) = J(h) +
∫ 1
0
λ(t)L(h)(t) dt . (7)
We keep the constraint h ≥ 0 without using a Lagrange multiplier. The opti-
mality system is : (
∂L(h∗, λ∗)
∂h
, h− h∗
)
≥ 0 forall h ≥ 0, (8a)
λ∗ ≥ 0 and λ∗(t)L(h∗)(t) = 0 a.e. t ∈ [0, 1] , (8b)
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L(h∗)(t) ≤ 0 and h∗(t) ≥ 0 a.e. t ∈ [0, 1] , (8c)
Here (·, ·) demotes the L2(0, 1) inner product. We propose to use the Uzawa
algorithm to solve this optimality system. We recall it for convenience:
Uzawa Algorithm
1. Choose λo ∈ L2(0, 1) and set n = 1;
2. Iteration n: λn−1 is known.
(a) Compute hn solution of
min{L(h, λn−1) | h ≥ 0 } , (9)
(b) Set λn(t) = max (0, λn−1(t) + ρL(hn)(t) )
where ρ > 0.
3. Stopping criterion : stop or set n = n+ 1 and go to 2.
We focus on equation (9) (λn−1 is known). First, we compute the uncon-
strained minimum :
min{L(h, λn−1) | h ∈ L2(0, 1) } ,
and we shall realize a posteriori that the constraint h ≥ 0 is satisfied. Therefore,
it is the solution to (9) as well. So we have to solve
∀v ∈ L2(0, 1)
(
∂L(h, λn−1)
∂h
, v
)
= 0 , (10)
(
∂L(h, λn−1)
∂h
, v
)
=
∫ 1
0
(
∂ϕ(h)
∂h
− F (t)
)
v(t) dt+
∫ 1
0
λn−1(t)
(
∂L(h)
∂h
)
v(t) dt .
Let us compute∫ 1
0
λn−1(t)
(
∂L(h)
∂h
)
v(t) dt =
∫ 1
0
λn−1(t)
(
tv(t)− α
∫ t
0
v(s)ds
)
dt .
Setting
U(t) =
∫ t
0
v(s) ds , for any v ∈ L2(0, 1) ,
and
Λn−1(t) =
∫ t
1
λn−1(s) ds ,
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(the primitive function of λn−1 that vanishes at 1) with an integration by parts,
gives∫ 1
0
(
λn−1(t)
∫ t
0
v(s)ds
)
dt =
∫ 1
0
Λ′n−1(t)U(t) dt = −
∫ 1
0
Λn−1(t)v(t) dt.
So ∫ 1
0
λn−1(t)
(
∂L(h)
∂h
)
v(t) dt =
∫ 1
0
(tλn−1(t) + αΛn−1(t) ) v(t) dt .
Finally equation (10) turns to be
∀v ∈ L2(0, 1)
∫ 1
0
(
∂ϕ(h)
∂h
− F (t) + tλn−1(t) + αΛn−1(t)
)
v(t) dt = 0 ,
that is
∂ϕ(h)
∂h
− F (t) + t λn−1(t) + αΛn−1(t) = 0 a.e. t ∈ [0, 1] .
This yields
f(t)
(
t
3
− t
2δ
2
√
3 h(t)
)
− F (t) + tλn−1(t) + αΛn−1(t) = 0 a.e. (11)
This gives, for every t ∈]0, 1],
t
3
− t
2δ
2
√
3 h(t)
=
F (t)− tλn−1(t)− αΛn−1(t)
f(t)
,
t2δ
2
√
3 h(t)
) =
t
3
− F (t)− tλn−1(t)− αΛn−1(t)
f(t)
=
t f(t)− 3 [F (t)− tλn−1(t)− αΛn−1(t)]
3 f(t)
,
2
√
3 h(t) =
3 t2δ f(t)
t f(t)− 3 [F (t)− tλn−1(t)− αΛn−1(t)] ,
and finally
hn(t) =
3
4
[
t2δ f(t)
t f(t)− 3F (t) + 3 tλn−1(t) + 3αΛn−1(t)
]2
. (12)
We see that hn ≥ 0 and the constraint h ≥ 0 is fulfilled.
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3.3 Numerical results (α = 3/2)
We perform the numerical tests in the very case where α = 3/2 . This corre-
sponds to the model presented in Section 2
The discretization of the problem is done using a finite difference scheme on
[0, 1].
Let N ∈ N and ti = i∆t, i = 0, · · · , N where ∆t = 1
N
.
We approximate Λn−1(t) =
∫ t
1
λn−1(s) ds = −
∫ 1
t
λn−1(s) ds with a trape-
zoidal rule, namely
Λn−1(ti) ≃ −∆t
(
N−2∑
k=i+1
λn−1(ti) +
λn−1(1) + λn−1(ti)
2
)
.
The numerical tests have been peformed using MATLAB software and the fol-
lowing data :
f(t) ≡ 1 so that F (t) = t− 1, d = 1, c = 0 so that δ = 1 .
The stopping criterion is the following
max{‖hn − hn−1‖, |(λn, L(hn))|} ≤ ε ,
where ε is a prescribed tolerance. For different values of N we have tested
different values for ρ and the initial guess for λ. We present the solution that
was obtained with N = 2000, ε = 5.10−4, ρ = 3 and λo = 0.25.
J(h∗) ≃ −1.9725 10−2, number of iterations = 151 .
We may note that h∗ is not derivable at 0. This explains the “bad” numerical
behavior of the computed solution in the neighborhood of 0 (V is “better”).
3.4 Computing the “exact” solution
From now, we assume that
f(t) ≡ 1 and F (t) = t− 1 . (13)
The numerical computation shows that the optimal solution should satisfy
L(h∗) = 0. This allows us to compute (formally) the exact (analytical) so-
lution. Assume that we have
∀t ∈]0, 1] t h∗(t) = αV ∗(t) .
Therefore V ∗ is solution to the differential equation :
dV ∗
dt
=
α
t
V (t) ∀t ∈]0, 1], V (0) = 0 .
10
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Figure 1: Figure 1. Solution h∗ and V ∗ with λ∗ and the constraint L(h∗)
This gives V ∗(t) = νtα and h∗(t) = ναtα−1 where ν is a non negative number
to determine.
Let us compute
J(h∗) =
∫ 1
0
[
να
3
tα − t2δ
√
αν
3
t
α−1
2 − ναtα−1(t− 1)
]
dt
def
= Φ(ν) .
A short computation shows that
Φ(ν) = ν
α+ 3
3(α+ 1)
− 2δ
√
α√
3(α + 5)
√
ν .
The minimum of Φ is obtained for ν = 3α
(
δ(α+ 1)
(α+ 5)(α+ 3)
)2
, that is in the
case where δ = 1, ν = 3α
(
α+ 1
(α+ 5)(α+ 3)
)2
.
Finally we may give the “exact” solution of the problem
h∗(t) = 3
(
α(α+ 1)
(α+ 3)(α+ 5)
)2
tα−1 , (14)
and
J(h∗) = − α(α + 1)
(α+ 3)(α+ 5)2
. (15)
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This gives for α = 3/2 :
h∗(t) =
25
507
√
t, V ∗(t) =
50
1521
t
3
2 and J(h∗) = − 10
507
≃ −1.9723 10−2 .
Now that we have a good candidate to be the solution to our problem. We are
going to prove it. In the sequel we shall set
Cα
def
= 3
(
α(α + 1)
(α+ 3)(α+ 5)
)2
. (16)
4 Existence of the solution
In order to prove that h∗ is the exact solution that we are looking for we would
like to exhibit a Lagrange multiplier such that an Karush-Kuhn-Tucker opti-
mality system is satisfied. This Lagrange multiplier should be the ajoint state
that we study in the forthcoming subsection.
4.1 The adjoint equation
We consider now the following equation:
t λ(t) + α
∫ t
1
λ(s) ds+
dψ
dh
(h∗)(t) = 0 on ]0, 1] , (17)
where h∗ is given by (14). As F (t) ≡ (t− 1) and δ = 1 we have
ψ(h)(t) =
(
1− 2 t
3
)
h(t)− t2
√
h
3
,
so that
dψ
dh
(h∗)(t) = 1− 2 t
3
− t
5−α
2
2
√
3Cα
= 1− 2 t
3
− (α+ 3)(α+ 5)
6α(α+ 1)
t
5−α
2 . (18)
Setting Λ(t) =
∫ t
1
λ(s) ds, we get the differential equation

 tΛ
′(t) = −αΛ(t)−
(
1− 2 t
3
− (α+ 3)(α+ 5)
6α(α+ 1)
t
5−α
2
)
on ]0, 1[ ,
Λ(1) = 0 .
(19)
The solution λ∗ of (17) is λ∗(t) = Λ∗
′
(t) where Λ∗ is the solution of (19). The
resolution of (19) gives
Λ∗(t) = − 1
α
+
2 t
3 (α+ 1)
+
(α+ 3)
3α(α+ 1)
t
5−α
2 ;
we obtain
λ∗(t) = Λ∗
′
(t) =
2
3 (α+ 1)
+
(5 − α)(α + 3)
6α(α + 1)
t
3−α
2 . (20)
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Theorem 4.1 Assume that α ∈ [1, 5]. Then the function λ∗ defined by (20)
satisfies
λ∗(t) ≥ 0 forall t ∈]0, 1] ,
and λ∗ ∈ L1(0, 1).
Moreover, if α ≤ 3, λ∗ belongs to Co([0, 1]).
We may note that if α > 5, then λ∗ does not belong to L1(0, 1) and its sign is
not constant. This method fails in this case: we cannot conclude for α > 5. In
addition, if α ∈]3, 5], λ∗ does not belong to L∞(0, 1) : therefore we cannot prove
any existence result for (P1) but for (P∞) (that is the same problem where the
space function is no longer L1(0, 1) but L∞(0, 1)).
4.2 The optimality system when α ≤ 5
From now we assume that
1 ≤ α ≤ 5 ; (21)
this involves the case α = 3/2 of the model described in Section 2.
Let recall the Lagrangian function defined by (7)
L(h, λ) = J(h) +
∫ 1
0
λ(t)L(h)(t) dt ,
for (h, λ) ∈ L∞(0, 1)×L1(0, 1). The function L is convex with respect to h and
linear with respect to λ. Let us compute
∂L
∂h
(h˜, λ)h =
∫ 1
0
dψ
dh
(h˜)(t)h(t) dt+
∫ 1
0
λ(t)
(
th(t)− α
∫ t
0
h(s) ds
)
dt ,
for any h ∈ L∞(0, 1). As
∫ t
0
h(s) ds = V (t),
∫ 1
0
λ(t)
(∫ t
0
h(s) ds
)
dt =
∫ 1
0
λ(t)V (t) dt
=
[(∫ t
1
λ(s) ds
)
V (t)
]1
0
−
∫ 1
0
h(t)
(∫ t
1
λ(s) ds
)
dt
= −
∫ 1
0
(∫ t
1
λ(s) ds
)
h(t) dt .
Therefore
∂L
∂h
(h˜, λ)h =
∫ 1
0
(
dψ
dh
(h˜)(t) + tλ(t) + α
∫ t
1
λ(s) ds
)
h(t) dt .
Let us compute
∂L
∂h
(h∗, λ∗)h, where h∗ is given by (14) and λ∗ is given by (17)
(or equivalently (20) ):
∂L
∂h
(h∗, λ∗)h =
∫ 1
0
(
dψ
dh
(h∗)(t) + tλ∗(t) + α
∫ t
1
λ(∗s) ds
)
h(t) dt = 0 .
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So we obtain the desired optimality system
Theorem 4.2 Assume 1 ≤ α ≤ 5. The pair (h∗, λ∗) ∈ L∞(0, 1) × L1(0, 1)
satisfies the following optimality conditions :
∂L
∂h
(h∗, λ∗) = 0 , (22a)
λ∗ ≥ 0 on [0, 1] , (22b)
h∗ ≥ 0, L(h∗) = 0 on [0, 1] , (22c)
4.3 Existence of the solution of (P∞)
As the Lagrange multiplier λ∗ belongs to L1(0, 1) we cannot conclude that (P1)
has an optimal solution. Indeed, the “duality” product
∫ 1
0
λ∗(t)L(h)(t) dt does
not make sense unless h ∈ L∞(0, 1). Therefore we consider the problem
(P∞)


min J(h)
def
=
∫ 1
0
(ϕ(h(t)) − h(t)F (t)) dt
0 ≤ t h(t) ≤ α
∫ t
0
h(s) ds ∀t ∈]0, 1] ,
h ∈ L∞(0, 1) .
As the lagrangian function L is convex with respect to h, the optimality
system of Theorem 4.2 allows to conclude that h∗ is the optimal solution of
(P∞) and λ∗ is a Lagrange multiplier associated to the constraint L(h) ≤ 0.
Therefore, we may enounce the main result of this paper:
Theorem 4.3 If 1 ≤ α ≤ 5, problem (P∞) has a unique solution h∗ given by
(14).
Proof - The proof is standard, but we recall it for convenience. Since L is
convex with respect to h, equation (22a) yields
∀h ∈ L∞(0, 1) L(h∗, λ∗) ≤ L(h, λ∗) . (23)
For every h ∈ L∞(0, 1) such that h ≥ 0 and L(h) ≤ 0 this gives
J(h∗) +
∫ 1
0
λ∗(t)L(h∗)(t) dt ≤ J(h) +
∫ 1
0
λ∗(t)L(h)(t) dt ≤ 0 ,
since λ∗ ≥ 0.
As L(h∗) = 0, we finally have
∀h ∈ L∞(0, 1) such that h ≥ 0 and L(h) ≤ 0, J(h∗) ≤ J(h) .
As h∗ is feasible this means that h∗ is a solution of (P). As J is strictly convex,
h∗ is the unique solution. 2
We may precise this result if α ∈ [1, 3], since λ∗ ∈ L∞(0, 1) in this case.
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Figure 2: Comparison between exact and computed solution
4.4 Existence of the solution of (P1) when α ∈ [1, 3]
We noticed that λ∗ ∈ L∞(0, 1) if α ∈ [1, 3] and (of course ) h∗ ∈ L1(0, 1).
Relations (22) and (23) remain valid. By density of Cc(]0, 1[) in L1(0, 1) and
continuity of L with respect to the L1-norm we conclude with (23) that
∀h ∈ L1(0, 1) L(h∗, λ∗) ≤ L(h, λ∗) .
The end of the proof is the same as in Theorem 4.3. 2
We may note that if α = 3/2 then λ∗ =
4
15
+
7
15
t
3
4 . This corresponds to
the computed multiplier we have found in Section 3 (Figure 1.) We present
in Figure 2. the difference between the computed solutions and the analytical
ones.
5 Conclusion
We prove existence results within a generalized principal-agent model with lim-
ited liability on the agent’s utility. Due to the joined presence of adverse selec-
tion and moral hazard and the particular form of our problem, it is no longer
possible to apply usual economic intuition used within models that contain only
one type of private information to bind the limited liability constraint. A first
way to solve the problem is to find the solution of the unconstrained model and
then to guess the way the limited liability constraint is binding. We show within
our framework that there is no need to take into account adverse selection, the
usual economic intuition used within models that contains only moral hazard
being sufficient to bind the limited liability constraint.
A formal way to solve this problem is to focus directly on the optimal control
problem, the limited liability constraint becoming a mixed inequality constraint.
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From the mathematical point of view the case where α > 5 is still open :
it seems (at least numerically) that the optimal solution (if it exists) no longer
satisfies L(h) = 0. So we have to solve it via different methods. The work is in
progress and if the problem is completely solved, we hope it will help to let the
modelization process more general.
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